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Laws of Adoption.
Implanted in the heart of man are certain
affections. One of the truest and purest of these
is that which exists between parent and child. in
all quarters of the earth, among the different
raceB of men and through all eras of the world's
history, the character of this relstion has been
an index to the existing stages of civilization.
The literature of all lands redounds with tributes
to parental affection and filial love. The sun-
shine of child life comes alike to the lralace and
to the peasant's cottage.-- Who can n-ariber the
hearths that have been gladdened Ly the laughter of
children? But it often happens that the marital
relation is not productive of issue, so that lands
and titles are lost and broken in thei-r line of de-
scent, lives become drear and blank, and cheerless
-2-
' old age is unaccompanicd by youthful love and af-
fection. These misfortunes are diminished and
overcome by adoption or the legal relation created
by a person taking a child of another into his own
family, by which he assumes all the rights and lia-
bilities of the natural parent and the child for
all purposes is deemed his ovrn.
Adoption with its legal consequences was
well known to the ancients,and the civil law ex-
pressly sanctioned it, while on the other hand it
was totally unknown if not repugnant to the common
l aw.
During the time of Justinian the law of
adoption suffered considerable change. Before
that time the effect of adoption was to :lace the
person adopted in the same position as he would
have held, had he been born a son of -3-_,3on
adopting him. He bore the name of his adoptive
father, and was his heir at law. The changes made
by Justinian, however, comlpletely altered its char-
acter. It had sometimes happened under the old
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law, that a son lost his succession to his own
father by being adopted and to his adopted father,
by a subsequent emancipation. To remedy this,
Justinian provided that the son given in adoption
to a stranger, should be in the same position to
his own father as before, but gain by adoption the
succession to his adopted father if the adopted
father die intestate.
The adoptive person, however, was not
bound like the natural father to leavohim a share
of his property if he made a will. The adopted son
still remained in the family of his natural father
and the only change which adoption caused was, that
he acquired a right of succession to his adoptive
father if intost,Ate. ( Cooper's Justinian 29 )
This doctrine was transmitted to the modern nations
of Europe.
Adoption was, also, recognized by the
Code Nayoleon, though it contained the very strin-
gent provisions that the adopter must be fifty years
of age and without living children or legitimate
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descendants, fifteen years older than the person
adopted and a probationary period of six years
being required before the adoption takes effect.
The law as laid down by Napoleon was *adopfted by
Louisana. From the Spanish law it was transmitted
to Mexico, thence to Texas, and thus into the U.S.
Adoption being unknown under the common
law is of purely statutory origin in this country.
Mass. was the first state to enact laws governing
this subject. In 1857, a law was passed in that
state which conferred this right. Subsequently,
this statute came before the courts in the case
Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass., 262, where it was
found to be to general and comprehensive. The no-
tice of the legislature was brought to these defects,
and after having appointed a commission to investi-
gate and report the matter, a statute was passed in
1876, which because of its conciseness and complete-
ness
over previous legislation, has been accepted
as a model by other states. Since 1857, following
the example of Mass., nearly every state in the
Union has -assed statutesupon this subject. These
statutesvary much in their details, but have a com-
mon intent and purpose. Most of the statuteShave
been found defective br to narrow, necessitating
amendments ar a revision, so that the law as a
whole has been in a transitory state. Little lit-
igation, however,has arisen over the subject, as the
adopting parents do not prefer to die intestate, and
all controversies over the property being removed,
their is nothing left in regard to the statutes
over which men would naturally quarrel.
Who can adpt? All the statutes
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Who can Adopt?
All the statutes agree that the adopter
must be an adult. Following closely the Code Na-
poleon, the original statute of Louisana, had the
provisions that the person adopting shall be at
least forty years of age, and at least fifteen years
older than the person adopted. YThis was repeated
in 1872, by Act No. 31., which provided that any
person above the age of twenty-one years shall have
the right to adopt any one under that age. Success-
ion of Vollmer, 40 La.4nnual, 593; Sec.2,.12 Civil
Coee Cal provides that the person adopting a child
must be at least ten years older than the person
adopted.
By the law of New York and by the law
of nearly every state a married man or woman cannot
adopt a child without the consent of the other.
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This however, is not an universal rulein Indiana a
married man may adopt a child without his wife's
joining in the petition and the child may have an
adopting father without an adopting mother.(Barn-
hizel v. Finell, 47 Ind., 335 ) But in those
states where the adoption is not invalidated be-
cause of non-consent by one spouse, the other is
he.l d
not bound by the decree. Thus it wasA in Stanley v.
Chandler, 53 Vt., 619, that an adoption, under an
act of the legislature, by a husband without the
consent of his wife did not prevent the wife from
taking one-half of the estate the same as if no
heirs.
Who may be Adopted.
The lahguage used in most statuteis a
,'child'1, this undoubtedly means as it has been word-
ed in the N.Y, statute, and construed in R.I. (In
re. More, 14 R.I. 38 ) to be " any minor child".
Adults can be adoptel La 1ermont, by joining in
the deed of adoption;and the only restriction in
Mass., is that the person adopting be at least
twenty-one years of age and older than the person
adopted, who cannot be his or her wife, husband,
brother, sister, uncle, aunt, either of the whole
or half blood.
In all cases except when the adoption
consists merely in declaring the eorson adopted an
heir, the adoption must be founded on consent. The
reason 's that no peroson is supp osed to object to
having his financial condition bettered, but to
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take a child away from his kin, and friends and
subject him to the control of a stanger, is such an
interference with the rights of his parents, that
it will not be permitted without their free consent.
Hence all the statutes require the consent of the
parents, parent, guardian, next friend, next of
kin, corporation or other institution having the la
lawful custody of the child affirmatively, or that
notive be given to them so that they may appear and
be heard upon the question of adoption before the
court. Also, the consent of the child if over 14,
and in N.Y. if over
^twelve, and finally the sanction of the court
It is provided in N.Y. and the same
statute exists in most of the states, in substance:
,1 That the consent is not necessary from a father
or mother deprived of civil rights, or adjudged
4nllty of adultery or cruelty, and who is, for
either cause, divorced; or is adjudged to be an in-
sane person or an habitual drunkard, or is judic-
ially deprived of the custody of the child on ac-
count of cruelty or neglect."
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It has been adjudged in New Jersey, that
a parent is deemed to have abandoned his child so
as to render his written consent unnecessary, when
his conduct has evinced a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties, and relinquished all parental
claims to the child and that such an abandonment is
irrevocable. ( Winans v. Ltprie, 20 At., 969 )
Legal Effect.
The legal effect of adoption as provided
in N.Y. statute, L. 1873, oh. 830 as amendodiL. 1887
oh. 703 is as follows: 9 A child when adopted shall
take the name of the person adopting, and the two
thenceforth shall sustain toward each other the
legal relation of parent and child and have all the
rights and be subject to r i Lc duties of that re-
lation, including the right of inheritance,"and etc.
It is generally provided that the adopted child
shall take the name of the adopting parent. This
is accomplished by several methods, principally by
statute as in N.Y., Pa., and etc., but in Col. the
power is conferred upon the County Courts, and in
Mo., upon the probate courts.
Ey adoption the ado:-ting parent assumes
all the ri-hts, liabilities and duties of the
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nat'iral parent, even as against the natural parent
or lawful guardian. The adopting parent 6s entitlef
to the services of the child, but is not entitled
to support even thouhi the child have property of
its own. ( Brown v. Walsh 27 N.J.E.,429. The adopt-
ing parent rmst provido protection, maintenance and
education for all purposes the same as if it was
kis own legitimate child. On the other hand the
adopting parent has exclusive control over the
child, and derivos the same benefit from its cus-
tody and services as if it was his own. This is
not the rule in Texas, however, under a modified
system of Spanish law existing in that state the
adopted heir has the rights of a natural child only
with reference to the estate, and does not become
a member.of the family of his adopter, invested
with the privileges and duties peculiar to the re-
lation of parent and chilc. ( Eckford v. Knox, 67
Texas, 20 ) Vhen there is a conflict between
two parties as to who is the adopted parent the
court alwav socs the best interest of the child and
awards its custody accordingly.Fouts v.Pierce 63 Ia.71
Inherit ance.
The most irmporta,;t feature of the law of
adoption is the riAght of inheritance and succession
to real and personal property. One of the p.rimary,
i:otives, which lead people to take another8child as
their own, is their desire for an heir and thus
keep the bulk of their fortunes in the family name.
As a general rule there is no d~fference in the ex-
tent of the inheritance between adopted and natural
legitimate children. The former take under the
statute of descent and distribution the same as the
latter with few limitations which will be noticed
later. The right of inheritance is made Tutual
between the adopting parent and the child, so that
where the adopted child dies intestate without law-
ful issue, seized of real estate or owning person-
al property, which may have come to him from his
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adopted parents sn his property shall descend to
the adot td parents or their heirs at law to the
entire exclusion of his natural heirs at ia7:.(Davis
v. King, 95 1nd., 1) So under i.Lass. statute ch.124
sec. 3, providing that when a husband dies intestate,
and " leaves no'issue living" his widow shall receive
a certain portion of the land and an adopted child
is ,, issue" under such statute (Buckley v. Frazier,
27 IN.E.,768) But by a descision of an inferior
court in Penn. it was held that an adopting parent
could not inherit from the adopted child. The
judge holding that adopted children inherit equally
with natural children because the statute expressly
so declares2 and in the absence of a declaration
giving the adopting parent power to inherit that a
strict construction of the statute should be taken.
This undoubtedly is carrying the rule to far and is
not good law. But an adopted child cannot inherit
from his adopted parent. ancestors nor if he hap-
pened to be a grand-son of the adopting father can
he inherit the property of his grandfather in a two-
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fold capacity, as a son and grandson.(Delano v.
Brewster, 148 Mass. ,619) In Iowa however, it was
decreed that when a father adopted two children of
his daughter, and afterwards died, leaving no will
that the children so adopted would inherit from him
as his own children and would also inherit the
share of their deccased mother. (Wagner v. Varner,
50 Iowa, 532) These two cases are in direct
the
conflict. The Mrass. case is based upon A point
that the provision in the statute providing that "
" no person aiI, by being adopted, lose his right
to inherit from his natural parents or kindred"
does not include the adopting parent, Vhile in
the Iowa case the judge thought that the act of
adoption did not take away any existing rightsor
such as may accrue, but gave him certain additional
rights. This latter view seems to be the more
logical, and would undoubtedly be supported by the
New York courts if the question should arise in
this state. There being no statute in this state
like the one in Mass., and our statute being silent
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as to the exact relationship of an adopted child
and its natural parents, the reasoning of the Towa
case would aply.
In Texas if the party adopting have at
the time or thereafter a child begotten in lawful
wedlock, the adopted heir cannot inherit more than
one-fourth of the estate of the party adopting him.
(Eckford v. Knox, 67 Texas, 260)
It is provided in several states that the
deed of adoption shall state the terms which the
adopter and adopted shall bear to each other. Thus
in Nebraska the terms must be stated in the petition,
so in Mississip:i, the petttion must state what
gifts and grants it is proposed to bestow upon the
adopted child.
There are tw6 great limitations to the
adopted chila's "ri-.t of inheritance, namely, a
stranger cannot be introduced into the right of suc-
cession to property limited to a man and " the
heirs of his body". Nor can an adoption so dis-
turb the.descent or distribution of the property as
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to enable an adopted child to inherit from the
lineal or collateral kindred of ?his adopting parent
by right of representation. These are substanti-
ally the limitations imposed in the Mass. statute,
and 11 heirs of the body" in this connection has
been interpretated to have its technical meaning
(2 Redfield on riills, 398-9) The reason for the
first is obvious. Property limited to a man and
t, his heirs" would be entirely within the control
of the devisee, he being able to adopt an heir at
any time and thus destroy the intehtion of the tes-
tator.
But as to the latter limitation the cases
do not agree. in Indiana the rights of the lawful
children of the adopting yarent and the ado-ted child
are not changed or affected by the adoption. No
right is given them to inherit frem or through
each other, they are not only not brothers and sis-
ters but they have no rights as such.(Barnhezel v.
Ferrel 47 Ind.,335) In direct conflict with this
case is the statute of Penn., providing that " if
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such adopting parent shall have other childiun, he
she or they shall resyectivcly inherit from and
through each other as if all had been lawful child-
ren of the same parent."1 Yet it has been hell
th-t such adopted child cannot take under a devise
tc the"children" of the parent by adoption; for it
is not a child by nature. (Shafer v. Enue, 54 Pa.St.
304)
Our New York statute provides that the
child adopted and its adopted father shall bear to
each other the relation of parent and child uexcept
that as respects the passing and limitation over of
real ahd personal property, under and by deed,
conveyances, wills, devises and trusts dependent
upon the person adopting, dying without heirs, said
child adopted shall not be deemed to sustain the
legal relation of child to'the person so adopting
so as to defeat the rights of remaindermen." No
case has ever arisen in wihich this provision has
been construed,but the same reasoning would apply
as to the"heirs"of his body" found in the statutes
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of the other states. As to inheriting from tho lin-
eal or collateral Lindrod of its adopting rarent by
right of representation the statute is silent, but
construin- the statute as a 7holc it would scom that
such right existccl.
The Relation of an Adoated Child to its Natural 'Ein.
By ado-tion a child may have a status in two
families. Thile he may be a mnember of one family,
he will loose -I.o-n of the rights which existed be-
twVoen 1im an" 'As nwstural parents. The statutes
of the state vary ..... Li defi,.ing the relation of
an a:)-ted chil and his natural , and some of
the stat utes are silent all together, so that co-
plication5ofter, arise as to the right of inheri-
tance betv, Torn the _ atural and those of adoltion.
Let us loch at some of the statutes of the various
states. 2h 1 y0 r Yorh statute is clear .3 on th-is
subject. I, provides:- ""hat the parents of an
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adopted child are, ftom the time of ado-tinn, re-
lieved from all parental duties toward and of all
responsibility for, the child so adJ.pted and have
no rights over it." As we have already seen in
Pennsylvania,-and the same statute also exists in
West Virginia,--the natural children, if any, and
the adopted children inherit from and through each
other. in Iowa, adopted children inherit from
both their natnral and acopting parents; but in
Conn. and Ill., they inherit only from their
adopting~parents. The adopting parents can-
not inherit from their adopted children in
Georgia, Iowa, Maine, and North Carolina.
In New Mexico an adopted child may be dis-
inherited.
The New York Statute provides that "the
heirs and next of kin of the child so adopted shall
be the same as if the said child was the legitimate
child of the person so adopting" and in case of the
death of tke person so adoptrl g the person so adop-
ting as above provided shall for the purpose of in-
heritance sustain the relation of parent to the per-
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son so adoi ted." Thus it s.. u I eem that the
chaild is entirely cut off from his heirs ac,. r-cxt
of hin oxcept in the case where pro> 'rty is li.nitcd
to his adoptin- pare'-ts; and the aroDL tin prnt s wo
7-ould inherit from the adopted child to the exclusion
of the natural parents.
It hcs be- o" I n d , that where a
child aorC.ted by a husband and '-is wife,jointlydies
without children or their desce.dants;the owner of
land inherited from the adoptins, mother, the sur-
viving husi'and1 and -;dopting fhr inherits such
land,and it does -ot descend to the natural mother.
Humpherics vs. Davis, lQ&Ind., 274. This is a very
important and instructivo case, revicing a large
number of aut-.orities, and clearly shows the posi-
tion of the courts on this subject. The judge in
rendering the decision said,- "It is not to be pre-
siumed that the legislature meant to violate logical
rules by creatin: the egal relation of child without
the corresponding one -f parent no- that they meant
to thrust out the surviving husband and father for
the benefit of a 1-erson that w-as a stranger to the
ancestor ::ho -was tihe sourcn :F title. it 1s a
princi, le of America± a-- 'o;.i la'., that in carea
of failure of descendants capable of taking, the in-
heritance shall so bac- to the kinsm rai of the "Aood
from which it caudo. To produce uniformity and
harmony it -ust be hold , as we now hold, that the
death of the adoptcd child casts the ,nh,ritancc
whrich came to him through the joint aldo:rtion bach to
his ado:tive father, and not upcon the n:atural mother
who was an utter stranger to the person from whoa t
the title flowed. It may be that this would require
that what the adoptbd , child inherits from its
natural hlinsmen should so back to them, but if so,
it is a good -esult, for this is no more than right."
In Wagner vs. Barner, Supra, it was said:
"because of the adoption the child -requires cert-in
additional ri1gts ,but there is nothing in the act of
a-o-tion v hich in &v of itsolf tahes away other ex-
istin4ights, or such as subsequently accrue. The
reason which supports this r-.le does not apply to
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the rother. She in le:oal effect, severs all legal
rights to the Trr7o.c,,rt y which the aild may acquire
by virtue of its status to the adoytive p.arents for,
as to that prorerty, she rI.ermits the correlative re-
lat ion of r arc a- child to exist betvieOn the
child and the adoptivc 7a:'e.. it does her :,o in-
justice to have her with her right to ouch -r;perty
as >cr child may acquire otherwise tha- through the
adoptive rarent, but it wogld do great injustice to
permit her to secure - e' mert, acqui- .  by her
child in virtue of both its natural anc' ai;o-I ive
I
rights." I think the rea°soning in this case is
sound and vould a::ly in contstruing the New YorK
statute. it could seem that it would sUiily and
spea1 v1ere our statute is silent ,.,_ th-'e car. be
no doubt that if a like case should arise in this
state the result would be the same. This case in
many respects, is the most important found in the
reports as it clearly defines the legal status of
all the parties inte--cst.. in the act of afo:tion.
Conflict in the I,,sof AdoTption.
In viev. of the diversity of the statutes
it becomes im~ortwnt to tnquire vnat is the ia: de-
termining a rticilar case of ado-tin. So far
as concers the statut of the perso lo-tcd this
is to be determined by the lay: of his dIomicil though
there is authority holdting that where the act is
based uvon contract the la: relativ,( to conit-acts
rrevai ls.
The Ian of the nationality of t-le a 1opted
person is to dec ide in all that concerns his relations
to the a'ort .g person; the la. of the nationality
of the ad:rting person is to dlecide i all that con-
corns the relations of the latter to his onn f-alily.
And the la-,* of the domicil and not tue ia,, of the
nationality is to determine the status. In the
United States where the Ic-iElatl'-n of particular
states C-iffcrs so v~icly in this connection tD
t'hc the test of nationality ':oulK be iri~racticable,
Lach of the st,.tes is a -.art of one ratio-_ality; no
state is a distinct nation. -ach state howecver has
its special rle-islatio:, as to civil status;and
domicil, therefore, must determine wh-t partLicular
legislation is to a-ly. in this country therefore
the lavT of the doi.lcil of the parties must determine
the validity of the alol.tion. if both parties are
domiciled in the stato of a'ortion, then the adol-tion
should be '-eld extr-ttritcriaiiy valid, at least
in all states which accopt the -c'lJy of adowrtion,
or to whose nuri!rud(ncC do-tion is not repugnant.
But no state can declare that a rerson iot its dom-
iciled subject shall be the -f.o-t cd child of another
7er-on. Both the adoitcr and the adopted must be
personally subject to th(, !aw s of the state by whom
the adoTt7ion is e:actoi. Thus a chilr ado: ted,
with the consent of its father and the so.ction of
-27-
a judicial de-_ree in Pa-LL., :-he-c t":o parties are
domiciled at the time, under . statute by -.hich a
child so adoj~ted has the -auc riht of i-Xi ritalce
as the legitimate offspring hi the estate of the
adoryting father, is entitled, after the ado. t ing
father -nd the a-o!ted child hive -mi'ed their dom-
icile into Mass. ,to inherit there the real estate of
such father as against his collateral hei%s; al-
though his wife has given rc format consent to the
adoption aq is required under the st:tutes of iass.
Rosc vs. Ross, 12 L3ass., 213. This oase was
distinruished in part by Keegan vs. Geraghty, 101
Ill., 26. Thiis was acsc in which & child Vas
adop.tecd in "7is., and subsequently moved with its
r arents into Ill. After the death of the adopting
parents litia.tion arose between its natural -arents
and the hcirs of hc adoting parents, and the court
held that the rights of inheritance acquired by an
adoirted child under the iaw.s of a-other state, whore
he ws adoi:ted, -,ili be recognized' and uyhcl in this
state only so far as they be not inconsistent w.7-ith
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our laws of descent, so that if such chile cannot
take by descent by our statute, cannot take at all
no matter what may be the law of the state where the
adoption was made. The distinguishing point in
the two case is that the Mass. court decided that
the status is determined by the law of the domicil
and that this status is to be recognized and upheld
in every other state, so far as it is not inconsis-
tent with its own laws and policy. In that par-
ticular ease the laws of Mass. and Penr., w(re- not
so inconsistent but what effect could 1he 7iven to
the Penn statute in Mass., but in the 1I7. case
the judge acknowledging the rule as laid down in
Mass., yet thought that the laws of Vis., wore in-
consistent with thqse of ill. so no effect could be
given them.
-pecific Performance c-r a Contract to Adopt.
ft sometimec, har; ons that persons agree
to adoyt a child and leave it their prolrty and
actually taae the child into their fa:il]ies, but
fail to fulfil any of the statu-"tory requirments for
adoption. in such cases it is not the law or
statute regulating adoption that is to -relail but
the law relative to contracts. So that where a
certain and definite contract is clearly established,
even though it involves an, agreement to leave
property on the part of the -romisee, equity, in a
case free from all objections on account of the ade-
quacy of the consideration, or other cicumstances
rendering the claim inequitable, wiil compel specific
Perf ormance. 31aesphcre vs. 1.iarkham, 10 Hun, 322.
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The fact of b child entering the family
of another and living with it for a number of years,
fully performing its part of the contract is a suf-
ficient performance of the contract to take it out
of the operation of the statute of frauds. Shnarkey
vs. McDLriott, £. 1c., C47.
Perhaps the best that I can do is to quote
from Judge Barrets opinion in Gall vs. Gall, 19
N.Y. Sulpp., 332, which sums up the whole matter and
givol. the rules governing the subject. Tho Judge
said:- "It is certain that in this nlF - of .ases the
ordinary rules which govern in ctirrs "., compel the
specific periformance of contracts, and which fur-
nish reasonable safeguards against f_., l- :1c not
be extended, but should be regidly applied. These
rules reauire that the contract be certain and def-
inite in all its parts, that it be Yrrtual and founded
upon an adequate consideration, and that it be es-
tablished by the clearest and most convincing evi-
dence. That the remedy is a matter of judicial
discretion, and that relief should be withheld when
a decree for specific ,er-§ormance -;'ould ,vor: in-
justice to innocont th(ird persons or wvrhee it wuould
be contrary to :llblic policy.,, The im-ortant Cases
on this topic are:-
Co-ino v. Kidd, 19 N.Y., -'-. , 335;
VanTino vs. VanTine, 15 At., 240
Van Dyne vs. Vreeland, 12 N.J.7q., 142;
Andecrson vs. Shocley, 82 MIo. , 250.
Q.:asi Pur 'ta1 i :tion.
"Then, w:ithout cx - ss contract, a,- infart
is indefinitely taken into a fai.ily not a -An to it
the surrounding circumstances must give construction
to the act, and determine :hberer the infant is so
taken as a visitor, or a, a ser'a-.t for .gc to
c-orncd b- it, or as a boarlc or -fori o
Or tion :-C-2- C- . of tIhe
, or as a child af-tc.. by the family -1. the
relat of a child by bloodL or in -ore otho- --,_1
iar relation. In the asc -,e of yr of of sur-
rounding c1r--"-.tancec fro-.ior a cnt-r-Ect can be
imrl ic. the l:.v v7il not imn-fose one '-yri the -artics.
7.Tierc a._< vrh:i..lt ... i v.th Ais yar-
ent aftc reachin- the arc of -mao.ority, it is -
eumbent upon him, to sho: that the ordinary relation
of r-aiPnt and childl cid not exist between -::- Iiu
his rarent, that is an express co + ' - , between
them that the son should 'Lc oc.-pensated f&r his
services. Kaye v. Crau,.ford, 22 7is., 320; Pillage
v. Pillage, 32 77is., 136. And the rule relating
to natitr-l children appears to ar.rly ertually to
chil D -y adoyption. Mountain vs. Fisher, 22 Wis., 93.
When an infant is taken into a family, it is al-
ways the presumption that neither its support nor its
services are to be compensated except as the one com-
pensates the other. Thorp vs. Bateman, 37 Mich., 68.
There being no reason why a child by adoption sharing
the advantages, should not share the disabilities of
a child by blood;or *hy a child received into a
family from beneffoleance should have a larger rule
of right in it than a child in its chatge by order
of nature. The adoption of an infant into a family
as a child implies no contract to pay for its services
to the fanily; and an infant so adopted can recover
for such services against the head of the family only
-3-
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upon express contract.
The rule of evidence by which such ex-
press contract between parent and child, by blood
or by adoption, must be establisheo,," laId down in
lellage vs. Pellage, 32 Wis., 136. The Judge says:-
"The rule, is that the evidence of a contract to
compensate the services of a child must be positive
and direct, and the contratt cannot be inferred from
circumstances and probability." And Diahn C.J.,
adds by, way of explanation "It may perhaps be
going too far to say that, in every case of this
kind there must be positive proof of express con-
tract for the payment of wages or the m,ing of pe-
cuniary compensation for the services performed.
There may undoubtedly exist other facts and circum-
stances clear and unequivocal proof of which accor-
ding to the rule of evidence held in such cases,
will be equivalent to direct and positive proof of
an express contract. An express contract to pay,
or the relation of master and servant may. be as fairly
and incontrvertibly established by circumstancial
evidence as by that which is direct."
